Industrialisation - Meiji vs USSR
This Introduction was written under exam conditions as a practice. Take from it what you will...
Question: ‘Individuals, more than circumstance, are responsible for industrialisation.’ With reference to two countries, each chosen from a different region, to what extent do you agree with this judgement?
Stephen Gardiner accurately postulated that Industrial Revolutions have been one "of those extraordinary jumps forward in the story of civilisation." Industrialisation is a powerful tool to propel modernisation and economic development. The industrial revolutions of Meiji Japan and Soviet Russia are no exception, providing a platform for these nations to step up onto equal footing with the economic powerhouses of the modern world. But to what extent was this rapid change a product of individual brilliance and political engineering versus foreign pressures and circumstance? While undoubtedly a nuanced combination of both these factors, this essay identifies the curiosity and desire for economic development by key individuals as a critical factor in the industrialisation of these states. To deconstruct the complex relationship between individuals and industrial policy, we will consider the role of individuals in creating and administering state policy, the role of state-led industrialisation, and the necessity for industrialisation within periods of tense foreign relations.
Independence Movements - Kosovo
I would personally stay the hell away from independence movements as a category, simply because we don't have the breadth of information necessary to answer these types of questions, and even ffrom the case studies we have done, there is a level of sophistication regarding the 'independence movement' component of them which can be quite tricky... Nevertheless, here is an example intro (NOT WRITTEN UNDER TIMED CONDITIONS). Might help with some ideas for Paper 1 Question 4
Question: 'Independence movements succeed or fail based on the quality of their leaders'. To what extent do you agree with this view?
Kosovo’s battle for independence within the politically charged Balkan region has been plagued by ethnic divide, symbolic historical battles, and regional instability. Yet this complex journey is defined by the role of leaders in uniting the Kosovar-Albanian people under the mantra and promise of a brighter future. In many ways, the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova, the figurehead of the Kosovar independence movement, was one of pacifism and mediation. So what role did Kosovar leadership play in their path to independence from Serbia? What role did the international community play in ensuring Kosovo’s successful path to independence, and how instrumental was Rugova’s leadership style in propelling this process? This essay argues that Rugova’s leadership was not defined by military brilliance or even public support, but rather his natural ability to garner support from the international community. In order to fully evaluate the value of Rugova’s leadership in Kosovo’s independence movement, we must consider Rugova’s style of leadership, the inevitability of international intervention, and the nature of Milosevic’s dictatorial rule.
20th Century Wars - Kosovo and Vietnam:
This one wasn't written in exam conditions, and is by no means perfect. Potential traps with this type of question are to spend too much time considering the 'success' of international intervention rather than the 'role of'. Also, paragraphs should always tie back to the role of foreign intervention in DETERMINING THE OUTCOME of the war.
Question: Assess the role of foreign intervention in determining the outcome of two twentieth century wars.
With rapid development of military capabilities over the course of the 20th century, foreign intervention has proven decisive in the outcome of conflict, yet also introduces a number of challenges. In both the Kosovo War of 1998-1999 and Vietnam War of 1955-75, international intervention was an extremely influential factor in the wars’ conclusion. But to what extent was international intervention welcomed by the local populations? How successful was the international community in achieving its aims? This essay argues that the international community largely had a detrimental effect on less developed populations, and poor coordination and communication often led to military failures. Nevertheless, foreign intervention has proven an extremely powerful demonstration of modern remote warfare, and reshaped both Kosovo and Vietnam’s socio-economic landscape. To explore this further, we can consider how successful international intervention was at achieving its aims, the capacity for rebel forces to counter foreign intervention, and how the socio-political zeitgeist of intervening nations impacted the effectiveness of intervention.
The objective of international intervention is often to limit the power or influence of a certain group who acts or has the capacity to act in ways which may threaten local populations. In Kosovo, NATO intervened to eliminate the Serb presence in the autonomous state, triggered by the public displays of attempted genocide by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. Primarily comprised of the bombing campaign Operation Allied Force, NATO successfully deployed 38,000 air missions to eliminate strategic Serb targets such as radio stations and military stockpiles. With no combat fatalities, the campaign was dubbed “one of the most successful strategic bombing campaigns ever” and was extremely successful in achieving its objectives. Conversely, in Vietnam, American intervention was comprised of the saturation bombing campaign known as Operation Rolling Thunder. Its objectives were to end the North Vietnamese support for the Viet Cong, yet failed to respect the resolve of the indignant North Vietnamese forces, with over 1,400 planes shot down between 1965-1968. Ho Chi Minh made a statement to American authorities saying “You may kill 10 of my men for every one I kill of yours. But even at these odds, you will lose and I will win.” The North Vietnamese understanding of the fragile dynamics behind US intervention allowed them to withstand the gruelling bombing campaign, and prevented the US from swaying the outcome of the civil conflict.
However, the success of international intervention was also influenced by the socio-political zeitgeist of the West. The Kosovo War was widely regarded as a “consensus war”, which depended upon the concurrent agreement of many NATO nations before any mission could be undertaken. NATO intervention necessitated coordination and communication round the clock, yet every decision was made with political and economic ramifications in mind. With the failures of Vietnam and the memory of the Battle of Mogadishu, the largely-US force were limited by public opinion, and President Bill Clinton explicitly stated “I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war”. Without troops on the ground, airstrikes required absolute precision, and international failure to do so led to decisive failures such as the bombing of the Chinese Embassy and an aid convoy. Though international intervention was insurmountable for the Serb opposition, such mishaps may easily have led to a larger scale conflict with China and Russia, who opposed NATO intervention. Similarly in Vietnam, foreign intervention was dependent on local American support, particularly as the conflict was the first televised war of the 20th century. As US involvement was widely perceived from its anti-communist agenda, US citizens had little support for the large loss of American life; epitomised by the Washington DC moratorium in 1969 and the Keng State University protests of 1970. Historians Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts identified an idealistic imperialism which blinded US policy regarding the war, and identify that the government had no capacity to amass public support for an ideological war. Though international intervention somewhat prolonged the ARVN opposition to the Viet Cong, the US was never fully committed, and this prevented them from reversing what appeared to be an inevitable conclusion.
As globalisation continues to unify nations, foreign intervention developed substantially over the course of the 20th century. Technology has proven the most effective medium to have a substantial impact without risking the lives of armed troops, yet demonstrably necessitates an absolute accuracy and precision which has not been achieved in either the Vietnam or Kosovo Wars. Though these campaigns have invariably impacted the outcome of both wars, the fragile dynamics of remote warfare have led to potentially catastrophic failures. Minute-by-minute media coverage highlights the role of domestic support for intervening nations, and the outcome of foreign intervention in such wars is a combination of both local support and military strategy. Advanced weaponry has already illustrated its destructive capacity over the course of the 20th century, and it is yet to be seen whether remote warfare is the most effective form of intervention in years to come.
Democratic States - Weimar:
Question: With reference to one democratic state, assess how effectively it dealt with the economic, ideological and political challenges it faced.
As outlined by military historian Gordon Craig, the underlying foundational flaws of the Weimar Republic were an “inherent instability which manifested into what appeared to the bemused spectator as a continuous game of musical chairs”. Facing a multitude of challenges from its inception in 1919, the Weimar Republic’s eventual decline was strongly attributed to its inability to deal with economic, political and ideological flaws. But was democracy in the nation destined to fail? On the whole, the democratic government was able to deal with the issues, but couldn’t solve them. With a multitude of pre-existing issues, the ongoing risk to internal stability of the economic and political spheres proved too great to retain ideological faith in the democratic process. This essay argues economic hardship and political discord to be the critical underlying factor in democratic decline, further assessing the evolution of social outlook towards democratic ideology as a whole.
After the conclusion of World War I, the German economy faced a number of obstacles threatening the success of democracy. Inflation in 1917 caused prices to double, with wages rising no more than 50%; reducing living standards and increasing unemployment. Upon the instatement of Gustav Stresemann as foreign minister in 1923, the nation dealt with economic issues by improving foreign policy, with the implementation of the Dawes Plan seeing a $800 million USD loan paid to Germany to aid economic rehabilitation. By 1925, the nation was receiving twice as much capital from abroad as being paid in reparations, however was heavily reliant on foreign financing. Stresemann himself described the situation as Germany “dancing on a volcano”, with the economy, “only flourishing on the surface”. Effective in the short term, the end of the ‘golden era’ and the Wall Street Crash saw loans revoked and unemployment skyrocketing to 5.6 million in 1932; described by Volker Berghahn as “an unholy mess”. Furthermore, the Republic also attempted to bolster the economy by addressing social dissatisfaction. Ending passive resistance in the Ruhr in 1923, the industrial output of the nation returned to pre-war levels, a critical measure to stabilise the economy. Yet the Weimar Republic’s valiant efforts to revitalise the economy came to little success when the Wall Street Crash hit in 1929. With even the most established nations plunged into economic hardship, the Stresemann Era may yet have proven economically stable in the long term, with a number of promising policies pointing to economic independence. However, the inherent unsustainability in economic policy proved too great to survive international shocks, sparking public dissent towards democracy as the economy began to decline.
Another challenge faced by the Republic was the issue of political diversity; one which continually polarised society and prevented lasting consensus. Seen to be a subversive and revolutionary approach to traditional democracy, the Weimar constitution initiated proportional representation and the Reichstag government, which saw seven different governments between 1923-1930. A vast range of political perspectives was solved as political parties attempted to form a number of coalition groups. However, with coalitions collapsing on issues as trivial as building religious schools, the free and open proportional representation outlined in the constitution did little more than lead to social confusion and political instability; described by Walther Rathenau as “having a republic, but the problem is we have no republicans”. Furthermore, pre-existing ideological dissent towards the ‘November Criminals’ of the Weimar government could only be addressed through policy, forcing each party to prove their worth and the value of democracy to the nation’s citizens. Largely, the democratic government was able to prove themselves on a number of occasions, eradicating a number of extremist uprisings, such as the Kapp Putsch in 1920 and the Munich Beer Hall Putsch in 1923, effectively demonstrating the control and stability of the government at the time. To a great extent, the Weimar Republic took strides to addressing political diversity and reaffirming the value of democratic ideals, yet an inherent constitution-based flaw proved too great for the democratic system, opening the pathway for political extremism to grip the nation when social hardship set in.
Beyond the political and economic discord, Goldwin Smith accurately emphasised, “above every nation is humanity”, a sense of inherent reliance on social coherence in the stability of any nation. Unfortunately, the breadth of social instability and dissent was a key failure in retaining faith in democratic ideology. With unemployment remaining constant even through the ‘golden era’, low standards of living in the middle class paired with high levels of social division was a key issue left unresolved during Weimar’s lifespan. The government attempted to retain social support with the implementation of welfare benefits, such as increased pensions for the elderly. Yet Historian Richard Evans argued that “gun battles, assassinations, riots, massacres, and civil unrest” prevented Germans from possessing the “stability in which a new democratic order could flourish.” Contrary to this opinion, the improvements in social benefits in the mid 1920’s improved support for democratic systems. With real wages rising 90% in 1927, internal standards of living and belief in the merits of democracy was improved. The key issue was its long term sustainability. Extensive government debt after the Wall Street Crash resulted in cutbacks in welfare benefits, revitalising blame on the November Criminals and the “Stab in the Back Myth”. To a large extent, welfare policy with the intention of social appeasement was a promising step in retaining faith in democracy, but was not given sufficient time to outlive the economic consequences of the first World War. Seemingly the Republic’s greatest failure, the ability to retain ideological faith in democracy was a pertinent factor in its decline.
As noted by author Henry Adams, “chaos is the law of nature, order is the dream of man”. Weimar’s policies to address its democratic, political and ideological flaws were short-term in focus, amounting to a number of underlying issues which proved to undermine the democratic process in its latter years. With a number of politicians making strides towards tackling post-war challenges, improvements in social policy in the form of welfare benefits and successful improvement in foreign policy suggests an effective the inability to instigate sustainable change led to the inevitability of its decline. One of the greatest steps in revolutionising democracy in the 20th century, the inability to tackle a plethora of pre-existing challenges was Weimar’s greatest weakness; a failure which saw the rise of an anti-democratic sentiment equally as revolutionary.
This Introduction was written under exam conditions as a practice. Take from it what you will...
Question: ‘Individuals, more than circumstance, are responsible for industrialisation.’ With reference to two countries, each chosen from a different region, to what extent do you agree with this judgement?
Stephen Gardiner accurately postulated that Industrial Revolutions have been one "of those extraordinary jumps forward in the story of civilisation." Industrialisation is a powerful tool to propel modernisation and economic development. The industrial revolutions of Meiji Japan and Soviet Russia are no exception, providing a platform for these nations to step up onto equal footing with the economic powerhouses of the modern world. But to what extent was this rapid change a product of individual brilliance and political engineering versus foreign pressures and circumstance? While undoubtedly a nuanced combination of both these factors, this essay identifies the curiosity and desire for economic development by key individuals as a critical factor in the industrialisation of these states. To deconstruct the complex relationship between individuals and industrial policy, we will consider the role of individuals in creating and administering state policy, the role of state-led industrialisation, and the necessity for industrialisation within periods of tense foreign relations.
Independence Movements - Kosovo
I would personally stay the hell away from independence movements as a category, simply because we don't have the breadth of information necessary to answer these types of questions, and even ffrom the case studies we have done, there is a level of sophistication regarding the 'independence movement' component of them which can be quite tricky... Nevertheless, here is an example intro (NOT WRITTEN UNDER TIMED CONDITIONS). Might help with some ideas for Paper 1 Question 4
Question: 'Independence movements succeed or fail based on the quality of their leaders'. To what extent do you agree with this view?
Kosovo’s battle for independence within the politically charged Balkan region has been plagued by ethnic divide, symbolic historical battles, and regional instability. Yet this complex journey is defined by the role of leaders in uniting the Kosovar-Albanian people under the mantra and promise of a brighter future. In many ways, the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova, the figurehead of the Kosovar independence movement, was one of pacifism and mediation. So what role did Kosovar leadership play in their path to independence from Serbia? What role did the international community play in ensuring Kosovo’s successful path to independence, and how instrumental was Rugova’s leadership style in propelling this process? This essay argues that Rugova’s leadership was not defined by military brilliance or even public support, but rather his natural ability to garner support from the international community. In order to fully evaluate the value of Rugova’s leadership in Kosovo’s independence movement, we must consider Rugova’s style of leadership, the inevitability of international intervention, and the nature of Milosevic’s dictatorial rule.
20th Century Wars - Kosovo and Vietnam:
This one wasn't written in exam conditions, and is by no means perfect. Potential traps with this type of question are to spend too much time considering the 'success' of international intervention rather than the 'role of'. Also, paragraphs should always tie back to the role of foreign intervention in DETERMINING THE OUTCOME of the war.
Question: Assess the role of foreign intervention in determining the outcome of two twentieth century wars.
With rapid development of military capabilities over the course of the 20th century, foreign intervention has proven decisive in the outcome of conflict, yet also introduces a number of challenges. In both the Kosovo War of 1998-1999 and Vietnam War of 1955-75, international intervention was an extremely influential factor in the wars’ conclusion. But to what extent was international intervention welcomed by the local populations? How successful was the international community in achieving its aims? This essay argues that the international community largely had a detrimental effect on less developed populations, and poor coordination and communication often led to military failures. Nevertheless, foreign intervention has proven an extremely powerful demonstration of modern remote warfare, and reshaped both Kosovo and Vietnam’s socio-economic landscape. To explore this further, we can consider how successful international intervention was at achieving its aims, the capacity for rebel forces to counter foreign intervention, and how the socio-political zeitgeist of intervening nations impacted the effectiveness of intervention.
The objective of international intervention is often to limit the power or influence of a certain group who acts or has the capacity to act in ways which may threaten local populations. In Kosovo, NATO intervened to eliminate the Serb presence in the autonomous state, triggered by the public displays of attempted genocide by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. Primarily comprised of the bombing campaign Operation Allied Force, NATO successfully deployed 38,000 air missions to eliminate strategic Serb targets such as radio stations and military stockpiles. With no combat fatalities, the campaign was dubbed “one of the most successful strategic bombing campaigns ever” and was extremely successful in achieving its objectives. Conversely, in Vietnam, American intervention was comprised of the saturation bombing campaign known as Operation Rolling Thunder. Its objectives were to end the North Vietnamese support for the Viet Cong, yet failed to respect the resolve of the indignant North Vietnamese forces, with over 1,400 planes shot down between 1965-1968. Ho Chi Minh made a statement to American authorities saying “You may kill 10 of my men for every one I kill of yours. But even at these odds, you will lose and I will win.” The North Vietnamese understanding of the fragile dynamics behind US intervention allowed them to withstand the gruelling bombing campaign, and prevented the US from swaying the outcome of the civil conflict.
However, the success of international intervention was also influenced by the socio-political zeitgeist of the West. The Kosovo War was widely regarded as a “consensus war”, which depended upon the concurrent agreement of many NATO nations before any mission could be undertaken. NATO intervention necessitated coordination and communication round the clock, yet every decision was made with political and economic ramifications in mind. With the failures of Vietnam and the memory of the Battle of Mogadishu, the largely-US force were limited by public opinion, and President Bill Clinton explicitly stated “I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war”. Without troops on the ground, airstrikes required absolute precision, and international failure to do so led to decisive failures such as the bombing of the Chinese Embassy and an aid convoy. Though international intervention was insurmountable for the Serb opposition, such mishaps may easily have led to a larger scale conflict with China and Russia, who opposed NATO intervention. Similarly in Vietnam, foreign intervention was dependent on local American support, particularly as the conflict was the first televised war of the 20th century. As US involvement was widely perceived from its anti-communist agenda, US citizens had little support for the large loss of American life; epitomised by the Washington DC moratorium in 1969 and the Keng State University protests of 1970. Historians Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts identified an idealistic imperialism which blinded US policy regarding the war, and identify that the government had no capacity to amass public support for an ideological war. Though international intervention somewhat prolonged the ARVN opposition to the Viet Cong, the US was never fully committed, and this prevented them from reversing what appeared to be an inevitable conclusion.
As globalisation continues to unify nations, foreign intervention developed substantially over the course of the 20th century. Technology has proven the most effective medium to have a substantial impact without risking the lives of armed troops, yet demonstrably necessitates an absolute accuracy and precision which has not been achieved in either the Vietnam or Kosovo Wars. Though these campaigns have invariably impacted the outcome of both wars, the fragile dynamics of remote warfare have led to potentially catastrophic failures. Minute-by-minute media coverage highlights the role of domestic support for intervening nations, and the outcome of foreign intervention in such wars is a combination of both local support and military strategy. Advanced weaponry has already illustrated its destructive capacity over the course of the 20th century, and it is yet to be seen whether remote warfare is the most effective form of intervention in years to come.
Democratic States - Weimar:
Question: With reference to one democratic state, assess how effectively it dealt with the economic, ideological and political challenges it faced.
As outlined by military historian Gordon Craig, the underlying foundational flaws of the Weimar Republic were an “inherent instability which manifested into what appeared to the bemused spectator as a continuous game of musical chairs”. Facing a multitude of challenges from its inception in 1919, the Weimar Republic’s eventual decline was strongly attributed to its inability to deal with economic, political and ideological flaws. But was democracy in the nation destined to fail? On the whole, the democratic government was able to deal with the issues, but couldn’t solve them. With a multitude of pre-existing issues, the ongoing risk to internal stability of the economic and political spheres proved too great to retain ideological faith in the democratic process. This essay argues economic hardship and political discord to be the critical underlying factor in democratic decline, further assessing the evolution of social outlook towards democratic ideology as a whole.
After the conclusion of World War I, the German economy faced a number of obstacles threatening the success of democracy. Inflation in 1917 caused prices to double, with wages rising no more than 50%; reducing living standards and increasing unemployment. Upon the instatement of Gustav Stresemann as foreign minister in 1923, the nation dealt with economic issues by improving foreign policy, with the implementation of the Dawes Plan seeing a $800 million USD loan paid to Germany to aid economic rehabilitation. By 1925, the nation was receiving twice as much capital from abroad as being paid in reparations, however was heavily reliant on foreign financing. Stresemann himself described the situation as Germany “dancing on a volcano”, with the economy, “only flourishing on the surface”. Effective in the short term, the end of the ‘golden era’ and the Wall Street Crash saw loans revoked and unemployment skyrocketing to 5.6 million in 1932; described by Volker Berghahn as “an unholy mess”. Furthermore, the Republic also attempted to bolster the economy by addressing social dissatisfaction. Ending passive resistance in the Ruhr in 1923, the industrial output of the nation returned to pre-war levels, a critical measure to stabilise the economy. Yet the Weimar Republic’s valiant efforts to revitalise the economy came to little success when the Wall Street Crash hit in 1929. With even the most established nations plunged into economic hardship, the Stresemann Era may yet have proven economically stable in the long term, with a number of promising policies pointing to economic independence. However, the inherent unsustainability in economic policy proved too great to survive international shocks, sparking public dissent towards democracy as the economy began to decline.
Another challenge faced by the Republic was the issue of political diversity; one which continually polarised society and prevented lasting consensus. Seen to be a subversive and revolutionary approach to traditional democracy, the Weimar constitution initiated proportional representation and the Reichstag government, which saw seven different governments between 1923-1930. A vast range of political perspectives was solved as political parties attempted to form a number of coalition groups. However, with coalitions collapsing on issues as trivial as building religious schools, the free and open proportional representation outlined in the constitution did little more than lead to social confusion and political instability; described by Walther Rathenau as “having a republic, but the problem is we have no republicans”. Furthermore, pre-existing ideological dissent towards the ‘November Criminals’ of the Weimar government could only be addressed through policy, forcing each party to prove their worth and the value of democracy to the nation’s citizens. Largely, the democratic government was able to prove themselves on a number of occasions, eradicating a number of extremist uprisings, such as the Kapp Putsch in 1920 and the Munich Beer Hall Putsch in 1923, effectively demonstrating the control and stability of the government at the time. To a great extent, the Weimar Republic took strides to addressing political diversity and reaffirming the value of democratic ideals, yet an inherent constitution-based flaw proved too great for the democratic system, opening the pathway for political extremism to grip the nation when social hardship set in.
Beyond the political and economic discord, Goldwin Smith accurately emphasised, “above every nation is humanity”, a sense of inherent reliance on social coherence in the stability of any nation. Unfortunately, the breadth of social instability and dissent was a key failure in retaining faith in democratic ideology. With unemployment remaining constant even through the ‘golden era’, low standards of living in the middle class paired with high levels of social division was a key issue left unresolved during Weimar’s lifespan. The government attempted to retain social support with the implementation of welfare benefits, such as increased pensions for the elderly. Yet Historian Richard Evans argued that “gun battles, assassinations, riots, massacres, and civil unrest” prevented Germans from possessing the “stability in which a new democratic order could flourish.” Contrary to this opinion, the improvements in social benefits in the mid 1920’s improved support for democratic systems. With real wages rising 90% in 1927, internal standards of living and belief in the merits of democracy was improved. The key issue was its long term sustainability. Extensive government debt after the Wall Street Crash resulted in cutbacks in welfare benefits, revitalising blame on the November Criminals and the “Stab in the Back Myth”. To a large extent, welfare policy with the intention of social appeasement was a promising step in retaining faith in democracy, but was not given sufficient time to outlive the economic consequences of the first World War. Seemingly the Republic’s greatest failure, the ability to retain ideological faith in democracy was a pertinent factor in its decline.
As noted by author Henry Adams, “chaos is the law of nature, order is the dream of man”. Weimar’s policies to address its democratic, political and ideological flaws were short-term in focus, amounting to a number of underlying issues which proved to undermine the democratic process in its latter years. With a number of politicians making strides towards tackling post-war challenges, improvements in social policy in the form of welfare benefits and successful improvement in foreign policy suggests an effective the inability to instigate sustainable change led to the inevitability of its decline. One of the greatest steps in revolutionising democracy in the 20th century, the inability to tackle a plethora of pre-existing challenges was Weimar’s greatest weakness; a failure which saw the rise of an anti-democratic sentiment equally as revolutionary.